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Abstract— Wireless sensor networks offer the advantages of 
simple and low-resource communication. Challenged by this 
simplicity and low-resources, security is of particular 
importance in many cases such as transmission of sensitive 
data or strict requirements of tamper-resistance. Updating the 
security keys is one of the essential points in security, which 
restrict the amount of data that may be exposed when a key is 
compromised. In this paper, we investigate key update 
methods that may be used in wireless sensor networks, and 
benefiting from stochastic model checking we derive 
characteristics of these methods in security perspective. 
Keywords- sensor networks; security; key management; 
verification; 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Protection of data in transit is often provided by 
encryption algorithms that rely on cryptographic keys. 
Algorithms are assumed to be known by the attackers, 
whereas only secrecy of the key provides security as stated in 
Kerckhoffs' principle [1]. However, keys may get 
compromised over the time, therefore networks secured by 
encryption usually have the notion of key update where the 
current key is revoked and a new key is established. 
Today it is a very well-known precaution that the 
cryptographic keys should be updated over time, while it is 
still not clear how and especially when the keys should be 
updated. 
Several challenges are present in wireless sensor 
networks, in terms of cryptography. Most of the challenges 
arise from the constrained resources on the sensor devices. 
Memory and processing power limitations, as well as the 
demand for a long battery life generally eliminate the use of 
public key cryptography, therefore symmetric cryptography 
is widely used [2]. Besides, key types can also be affected by 
the limitations since pairwise keys (e.g. link keys) are more 
resource-consuming than group keys or network keys. In this 
study, we will focus on the symmetric network key updates.  
Key update, or rekeying, is an area that very limited work 
has been done. In essence, it is related to two standard 
notions of secrecy. First notion is forward secrecy, which 
implies that compromise of the current key should not 
compromise any future key. Then comes backward secrecy, 
which implies that compromise of the current key should not 
compromise any earlier key. Wallner et al. suggested that a 
shared key has to be updated on every membership change 
and redistributed to all authorized members securely to 
provide backward and forward secrecy [3]. This all-or-
nothing approach lacks flexibility to be suitable for low-
resource networks where excessive number of updates can 
drain the batteries faster than expected and cause loss of 
functionality. 
In this paper, we investigate characteristics of certain key 
update strategies that can be used in resource-constrained 
networks, using formal verification. We employ stochastic 
model checking techniques for reasoning about security, 
which allow deeper insights than qualitative techniques or 
simulation alone [4]. 
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized 
as: 
1) we present a collection of key update methods that can 
be used with wireless sensor networks, 
2) we establish a quantitative security analysis of key 
update methods using formal methods, 
3) we provide a modelling example on ZigBee wireless 
sensor networks that can be generalized to other types of 
networks 
4) we derive insights on the key update strategies based 
on analysis results, and interpretations of pros and cons in 
the security perspective. 
Besides, we present an application of stochastic model 
checking in security domain.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 
II, we define the key update strategies that we work on. In 
Section III, we present the details on constructing an analysis 
and the sample network that we work on. In Section IV, we 
interpret the analysis results and provide valuable 
information for not only researchers but also network experts 
that deploy security precautions; followed by the conclusion. 
II. KEY UPDATE STRATEGIES 
In this section we explain the key update strategies that 
we consider in this work. 
A. Time-based key update (TB) 
The notion of key update is often assumed to be 
periodical, such that key is updated after a certain time 
period. From now on we will refer to this periodical updating 
method as Time-based key update (TB). In contrast with 
other methods below, TB does not consider any key 
compromising event for triggering key update, except time. 
B. Message-based key update (MB) 
In this method, key is updated after a predefined number of 
messages are communicated [5]. The original method is 
actually proposed for pairwise keys, however we will 
consider MB for network keys so that it can be comparable 
with other methods in the paper. This approach counts the 
number of communicated messages and issues a key update 
after a certain number of messages communicated. MB does 
not consider leaving (and joining) devices, therefore is not 
aware of a device leaving the network while still holding a 
valid key. 
C. Join-based key update (JB) 
In this method, key is updated after a predefined number of 
new devices join the network [6]. Such an event presents a 
security risk since the device may become a legitimate 
attacker. For instance, it may have joined using an illegally 
obtained network key - which might happen by means of 
hardware (e.g. local key extraction from the chipset such as 
connecting a debugger, erasing the chip, then freely reading 
the contents of RAM), or software (e.g. a bug in the 
implementation that discloses the key after the session 
expires or terminates with the natural assumption that a new 
session key will be used for a future session) defects - and 
legitimate device can try to decrypt old communication that 
it has captured before joining the network. 
D. Leave-based key update (LB) 
In this method, key is updated after a predefined number of 
devices leave the network [6]. In practice, when a device 
leaves the network it may still own a valid key, hence a 
device leave presents a security risk. A counter in the trust 
center keeps track of the number of the devices left (or 
removed from) the network. When this number reaches the 
predefined threshold value, all the keys in the network are 
updated and the counter is reset to zero. The idea here is to 
have a key update strategy that is inspired by the nature of 
the wireless sensor networks where the number of exchanged 
messages can be relatively low and devices can be tampered 
with by outside parties. 
E. Join-Leave-based key update (JLB) 
In this method, key is updated after a predefined number of 
devices join or leave the network [6]. We consider each join 
and leave event as suspicious events and do not distinguish 
between them. JLB is powered by both JB and LB key 
update strategies therefore exhibiting the strength of these 
two. Since both join and leave events are considered, the 
threshold value is more sensitive than JB or LB. 
F. Hybrid key update (Hy) 
In this method, we employ multiple key update strategies, 
and issue an update whenever any of the update counters 
reaches its threshold [6]. All the counters (i.e. leave, join, 
message, and timer in this case) will be reset after the key 
update. In this way, we will be able to benefit from all useful 
key update strategies. Naturally, each key update strategy has 
a different strength e.g. performing well when too many 
leaves happen, or too many messages communicated, or the 
environment has less malicious activity, etc. In the hybrid 
key update strategy we will have all these strengths, with the 
cost of more computational power. Therefore we suggest the 
hybrid key update to be used in networks where the 
coordinator device has sufficient resources. For example, if 
the coordinator device is a mobile computer or a powerful 
handheld then we can implement the hybrid strategy. Note 
that we did not include JLB in Hy, since it is limiting a real 
hybrid phenomenon and we want to observe leave and join 
events separately. 
III. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
A. Verification Technique 
We employ Stochastic model checking, a powerful 
technique for verification and performance analysis of 
stochastic systems. As a rough comparison with simulation 
which is widely used in networking perspective, one 
application of this method is equivalent to a sufficient 
number of simulation runs as it covers the full behaviour of 
the model and delivers provably correct results. 
In the quantitative verification of all the key update 
methods considered, we formalized each method by doing 
necessary abstraction as needed for formal verification. In 
the network perspective, we focus on events such as joining 
and leaving devices, and messaging over the network. In the 
security perspective, we consider that leaving devices and 
messaging may cause key compromises. We designed our 
formal models to be stochastic, as we have events with 
stochastic delays such as device leave, device join, and 
messaging. As a result we developed a continuous-time 
Markov chain (CTMC) model for each of the key update 
methods.  
We specified the properties that we want to validate, in a 
stochastic temporal logic. Therefore, we are able check if the 
properties are satisfied and get quantitative answers. The 
model checking work is fully automated using the well-
established stochastic model checker PRISM [7].  
All the models and properties that are relevant to this 
paper and sufficient to replicate the results are available in 
[8], allowing customization for user defined networks.  
B. Network 
We work on ZigBee sensor network standard for the 
analyses throughout the paper. The latest specification of 
ZigBee (ZigBee-2007) [9] specifies a suite of security 
services that includes methods for key establishment, key 
transport, etc. Although each revision and supporting 
specifications (such as stack and application profiles) roll out 
improvements, key update strategies and proper 
determination of related security parameters still remain gaps 
in the ZigBee standard [10].  
We present the key points that are necessary for a clear 
understanding of our results, and omit all the details which 
are irrelevant to this study. ZigBee uses symmetric 
encryption, AES standard with 128 bits keys. A Network Key 
(NK) is the mere mandatory key in a ZigBee network, which 
is shared amongst all the devices and used to secure 
broadcast communications. A Trust Center (TC), creates and 
distributes the NKs. TC is an application running on a 
ZigBee device, that is unique in every ZigBee network. As a 
key component of ZigBee security, TC is assumed to run on 
a more powerful device (e.g. a coordinator) rather than a 
regular ZigBee end device. Two more types of security keys 
may exist in a ZigBee network depending on the security 
configuration: Master Key and Link Key. Unlike NK, those 
keys are pairwise shared. In this study we focus on NK as the 
key type and refer to it as the key, and we assume that the 
devices in the network already acquired the key. 
At this point we want to clarify an ambiguity. ZigBee has 
a security protocol named as NK Update, however this 
protocol does not specify when to update NK, which is what 
we are focusing on in this paper.  
C. Constructing the Analysis 
Let us first introduce the main assumptions. We assume 
that when TC updates the key, all the devices in the network 
successfully update their keys. Compromise of a NK affects 
all the devices in a network. TC is fully responsible of 
creating and distributing the NK, therefore there is no role of 
the devices in NK establishment. We assume that each 
device talk directly to the network coordinator, namely in 
star topology. This assumption makes sense especially in 
MB method, where coordinator is able to count all the 
messages.  
We configured all models with the same parameter 
values as we have listed in Table 1. For simplicity, we use a 
single parameter for key compromise per device which is the 
same for compromise by messaging and compromise by 
device leave. In addition to those parameters, we also have a 
unique threshold parameter for each key update method. The 
threshold values vary in order to get more different results, 
and are available on the result graphics in  Fig. 1. 
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF STRATEGIES 
In this section, we interpret the quantitative analysis 
results for each key update strategy by identifying strengths 
and weaknesses. In addition, we provide insights on 
verification perspective. We provide the graphical results of 
the analysis in Fig. 1 where transient probability of the 
network key being compromised is considered for each 
strategy. We excluded the numerical results since they may 
change when different parameter values are used. Instead we 
focus on the patterns in transient key compromise probability 
which define the characteristics of the considered strategy.  
 
TABLE I.  MODEL PARAMETERS 
Parameter Description Value 
Rjoin Rate of join, per device 1/180 
Rleave Rate of leave, per device 1/180 
Rmessage Rate of messaging, per device 1/15 
Pcomp Probability of compromise, per device 1/1000 
Size Initial and maximum network size 10 
 
TABLE II.  UPDATE THRESHOLDS 
Threshold Strategy Description 
M TB Number of months 
MSG MB Number of messages 
J JB Number of joining devices 
N LB Number of leaving devices 
JL JLB Number of joining or leaving devices 
 
We have used the input parameter values that we presented 
in Table 1, and we have issued a model checking for each 
time instant (and for each threshold value) that we specified 
in Fig. 1. The time unit (in the x-axis) in Fig. 1 is a month (30 
days). We also specified the threshold values that we used 
for analysis in Fig. 1, attached to each subfigure. The 
mapping of threshold names to update strategies is presented 
in Table II, including with the descriptions. One exception is 
the Hy method, where the threshold parameter is a collection 
of the corresponding threshold values of the methods that are 
included. For example, Hy=1 stands for M=1, MSG=20, J=1, 
N=6 in Fig. 1. 
 
A. Time-based key update (TB) 
Transient behaviour: TB exhibits a repeating sawtooth 
pattern where the probability of key compromise increases 
until a key update happens, and a sharp drop is occurring 
afterwards. Sawtooth pattern is not visible for sufficiently 
small threshold values, in other words update periods. 
Strength: This classical key update strategy is strong 
because it is robust and it does not allow any unexpected 
updates which can increase power consumption. Namely, it 
is easy to foresee how many key updates will take place, and 
it is easy to guess the impact of a change on the threshold 
value.  
Weakness: TB does not consider any source of key 
compromise, its mere concern is the time passed. Therefore 
it cannot be fitted easily to a specific network that has 
distinct properties such as frequency of communicated 
messages, joining/leaving devices etc. Besides there is 
always a significant difference between local maxima and 
minima of the risk due to the sawtooth pattern. Therefore, 
computing average risk is not sufficient in TB, maximum 
risk should also be computed before employing it as key 
update method. 
Verification perspective: Even though join, leave and 
messaging events exhibit stochastic delays, periodical 
updates have deterministic delays. Thus we improved the 
model with phase-type distribution in order to increase 
precision, which causes the model size to grow by factor of a 
shape parameter. This makes formal verification of TB 
difficult for large networks. However, produced state-space 
and model checking times are still better than MB. 
B. Message-based key update (MB) 
Transient behaviour: MB produces oscillations in the 
key compromise probability, which get stabilized after a 
certain time period that depends on the threshold value. For 
sufficiently small message thresholds the oscillations 
disappear. 
Strength: MB is very strong when majority of the key 
compromise events are caused by the messages over the 
network. Therefore, it should be considered when devices 
send vast amount of messages. 
Weakness: MB does not consider neither leaving nor 
joining devices, therefore ignores the risk of a device leaving 
with a valid key. Thus, in dynamic environments in terms of 
network membership MB itself is not strong. 
Verification perspective: MB is only better than Hy, in 
terms of state-space and model checking time. Number of 
messages that are communicated in a network for a certain 
time amount is directly proportional to the network size and 
messaging activity per device, therefore can quickly reach to 
very large numbers. This causes a big burden on the 
stochastic model checking since large numerical threshold 
values quickly exceed time and memory limits. We easily 
observed situations like state-spaces of 108, required memory 
of 3GB and fairly long computation times. 
C. Join-based key update (JB) 
Transient behaviour: In the beginning, key compromise 
probability increases with a decreasing slope until it reaches 
the maximum probability value. Then comes the smooth 
drop in the probability that lasts until reaching the steady-
state. 
Strength: In a network where number of join events is 
reasonably high, JB will perform better and have more 
control on the key compromise probability adjustment. 
Minimum threshold values can offer very high security, 
provided that compromises mostly happen by joining and 
leaving devices. 
Weakness: Naturally, a join event can only happen 
whenever there is room for a new device. If a network is 
fully utilized, then a join event is strictly bound to a leave 
event. Therefore, in such cases not only the rate of join but 
also rate of leave should be considered when assigning 
thresholds. 
Verification perspective: JB is very compact in model 
size, therefore one of the strongest strategies against state-
space explosion. 
D. Leave-based key update (LB) 
Transient behaviour: LB also produces oscillations in 
the key compromise probability, which reaches steady-state 
after a certain time period that depends on the threshold 
value. 
Strength: LB was inspired by the leaving devices who 
still possessed the valid network key. Therefore is very 
useful when a network is not stationary but dynamic. 
Weakness: Whenever a network is stationary, LB will 
fire less key updates which might be insufficient for high 
security concerns. 
Verification perspective: LB is a very compact model, 
like JB; therefore can successfully be used in verifying very 
large networks. 
E. Join-Leave-based key update (JLB) 
Transient behaviour: Even though JLB is a synthesis of 
JB and LB, the resulting transient behaviour actually 
resembles to JB. Yet, it exhibits a smoother stabilization 
pattern. 
Strength: JLB is powered by both JB and LB key update 
strategies therefore employs the strong parts of these two. 
Since both join and leave events are considered, a threshold 
value is twice more sensitive than JB or LB. In other words, 
we have more precision on the key update thresholds. 
Weakness: If the majority of the key compromise events 
occur from the communication over the network, then JLB 
might not be the optimum strategy or the threshold should be 
minimized to deal with this problem. 
Verification perspective: JLB is larger than JB and LB 
as a model but still produces less state space than TB, MB, 
and Hy key update strategies. JLB is not as compact as the 
models that inspired it, namely JB and LB. 
F. Hybrid key update (Hy) 
Transient behaviour: Hy exhibits a very stabile 
transient behaviour, where we do not observe significant 
fluctuations. Thus, its maximum risk is very close to its 
average risk. 
Strength: This strategy incorporates the strengths of all 
the other strategies excluding JLB, therefore we consider it 
to be the strongest one. An update is issued by considering 
the time passed, the number of devices joined, the number of 
devices left, and the number of messages sent. 
Weakness: Implementing this strategy on real devices 
require much more resource than implementing only one of 
the strategies above. Therefore, if the coordinator device 
(that is running the trust center application) that is 
responsible of key updates is not strong enough, then Hy 
won't be feasible to choose. 
Verification perspective: Hy is very modular, it is easy 
to add a new key update strategy, or remove an unwanted 
key update strategy. Technically, the maximum state-space is 
produced in Hy models, and in parallel with that the time 
needed to complete one model checking is larger than in any 
other strategy. However, we can exclude some of the heavy 
strategies such as TB or MB to customize Hy to have more 
performance. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we discussed the problem of updating the 
cryptographic keys in wireless sensor networks. We have 
studied different key update methods and produced insights 
supported by formal verification and quantitative analysis. 
As a result we identified strengths and weaknesses of the 
methods we considered, which will assist network designers 
and security experts to employ a key update method. Our 
future work will be on how this key update methods adapt to 
changes in network conditions. 
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Figure 1.  Probability of network key being compromised at a certain time instant for different threshold values. 
